Models of trade policy often depend on the efficient aggregation of individual preferences. While much of the recent empirical work on trade focuses on whether domestic coalitions form along class or sectoral lines, the process of preference aggregation itself remains understudied. In democratic countries, voting is typically assumed to be an unproblematic mechanism for aggregating preferences, but such an assumption may be misleading when the salience of trade policy is low or heterogeneous throughout the electorate. Using data from a survey of 36,000 potential voters in the 2006 US Midterm elections, this paper explores the salience of trade policy for voters as a whole and for populations predicted to be most affected by changing trade patterns. The paper offers an estimation of trade policy salience based on the degree to which voters held Senate incumbents accountable for their 2005 vote on the Central American Free Trade Agreement, relative to roll call votes on other issues of the day. The paper finds trade policy salience to be relatively low in terms of stated importance, in voters' knowledge of their representatives' policy positions, and in its effect on voters' propensity to vote for the incumbent. The low salience of trade policy, particularly among highly affected groups, calls into question voter-driven models of trade policy. 6 See for example: Alt and Gilligan 1994; Bailey 2001; Bailey et al. 1997; Busch and Reinhardt 1999; Gilligan 1997; Grossman and Helpman 1994; McGillivray 2004; Mayer 1984 
3 For both descriptive and analytic purposes, the paper uses the second Senate CAFTA vote, taken on July 4 See : Schattschneider 1935; Caves 1976; Baldwin 1984. machine" models 5 , politicians seeking re-election vie for voters in environments characterized by different industrial geographies and electoral institutions. 6 These models agree that voters matter, but diverge on which voters matter. In majority voting models, characterizations by economic interest of the voter may differ, but once preferences and institutional rules are defined aggregation is as simple as counting. Alternatively, influential voter models focus on variations in saliency -generally characterized by diffuse versus specific interests -which may lead some voters to care more about the issue, to be more knowledgeable, and thus to hold politicians accountable for their policy A finding of low salience in terms of knowledge or importance combined with low accountability of politicians on trade policy issues would suggest the need to reevaluate voter-inclusive models of trade policy, especially those with a generic call to the voter. Similarly, low variation in salience across groups would bring into question models focusing on the role of concentrated interests in shaping trade policy when such interests 5 Caves 1976 6 See for example: Alt and Gilligan 1994; Bailey 2001; Bailey et al. 1997; Busch and Reinhardt 1999; Gilligan 1997; Grossman and Helpman 1994; McGillivray 2004; Mayer 1984 groups are primarily characterized as voters. Likewise, if trade policy were found to be highly salient and voters held incumbents accountable for votes on trade, then prior work would have mistakenly ignored the influence of the voting process in trade policy formation.
Results from the 2006 election suggest that in the US trade policy is a low salience issue in terms of voters' stated importance, knowledge of policy outcomes, and holding politicians accountable for their decisions. In contrast to the predictions of many economic models, trade policy salience does not vary substantially across groups, even union members and others directly affected by trade policy. This conclusion leaves us at a crossroads. While recent survey-driven, empirical research on individual preference formation means we know more than ever about what voters want in terms of trade policy, this knowledge may tell us little about what policies voters will receive.
Testing Salience
The last decade has seen a proliferation of empirical tests of individuals' trade policy preferences using survey data, both in the US and internationally. 
where 0 a represents a constant, B is the multiplier effect of these summed difference (assumed to be negative), x (assumed to be 1 or 2) allows for non-linear effects of the distance, and i u is a randomly distributed disturbance term. requires the addition of the knowledge component (k) to the traditional multi-dimension model presented above (eq. 1):
where k ij ( 0 1 ij k   ) represents the individual's knowledge of the distance for any given issue between her own policy preference and that of the candidate under consideration. ij k =1 corresponds to the traditional assumption of perfect information. As ij k approaches 0, the relative importance of policy differences becomes muted, providing politicians greater leeway in policymaking. At ij k =0, all policy differences are unobserved, providing politicians complete leeway in policymaking on the specific issue.
Together, issue weighting ( ij w ) and preference knowledge ( ij k ) determine the degree to which an issue affects a voter's calculation of the value of voting for a candidate, or in other words, the salience of the issue. In turn, salience determines both the extent to which individual trade policy preference aggregation occurs through the voting mechanism and the extent to which certain voters' preferences may matter more than others.
Traditional Measures of Salience
The traditional measure of salience has been the "most important problem" In comparison to the other categories, International Trade not only garnered the lowest average rating (2.4) but was also the only category for which the modal response was "Somewhat Important" (Table 1 ). In fact, almost 10% considered International
Trade "Not important". The bar graph presented in Figure 1 
Knowledge:
Importance is only one component of salience. Trade may not rank highly, but if at least some set of voters are well informed, trade may still be salient on election day.
How well do voters know incumbents' positions relative to their own ( ij k )?
To gauge voter knowledge on issues which recently faced Congress, respondents were provided background information on a spectrum of news-making proposals that arose during the last Congressional session. After each proposal description, they were asked to identify first how they would have voted if given the choice ("For", "Against", and "Don't Know") and second how they thought each of their representatives voted ("For", "Against", and "Don't Know"). Half of the respondents correctly identified their Senators' positions on these issues, as measured by Congressional vote records (see Table 2 ). Although more than a third of respondents admitted to not knowing their Senators' positions, relatively few respondents -12% across all issues -incorrectly identified their Senators' positions.
However, the issue of CAFTA exhibited a clear knowledge gap for respondents. CAFTA was the only issue for which the majority (54%) of voters responded "Don't Know" when asked their Senators' positions. Only 31% correctly identified their Senators' positions.
Remarkably, more respondents (15%) provided an incorrect answer for CAFTA than on any other issue. 24 In each case, the difference between trade policy and all other issues was statistically significant.
As with importance, knowledge might differ across groups, with those perceiving themselves as losers being more cognizant of their representatives' policy decisions.
Using the respondents' self-reported preferences, Table 3 partitions respondents into three categories -those supporting CAFTA, those against CAFTA, and those stating no opinion ("Don't Know"). While those not stating an opinion on CAFTA were clearly less knowledgeable about their Senators' positions, those stating a preference "For" or "Against" CAFTA differed little in their answers. Additionally, within the population of respondents offering an identification of their Senators' positions, the percentage answering correctly (66%-67%) was equivalent for all three groups. Thus, contrary the Kahneman and Tversky based assumption that losers from international trade liberalization would pay more attention to trade policy, initial evidence supports the contention that stated preferences over the outcome of the CAFTA vote are unrelated to salience in terms of knowledge of representatives' policy positions. 24 The smaller sample of 1000 was also asked to identify the record of their Representative on CAFTA. The results were substantially identical to the analysis using the identification of Senators' votes. Two important findings emerge from the multinomial results (see Table 4 ). First, in contrast with the descriptive statistics, once controlling for other characteristics, the self-described anti-CAFTA respondents are significantly less likely to provide an incorrect answer and to answer "don't know", as would be expected by conventional theory. However, the substantive effect is, to say the least, minimal: anti-CAFTA sentiments decrease the propensity to provide the wrong answer from 14.8% to 14.6% and the propensity of stating "don't know" from 56.2% to 55.2%. In contrast, the effect of being male decreases the propensity to answer incorrectly from 16.0% to 13.2%, a full order of magnitude more than the effect of having anti-CAFTA sentiments. Those with no opinion are no more likely to be correct than incorrect in their answers, although they are more likely to state "don't know" than to provide a correct answer. Thus, while the survey does detect statistical differences, these differences are so minimal as to strengthen the arguments that knowledge is relatively constant across trade preferences.
Second and unexpectedly, given the usefulness of union organizations for information distribution, union membership increases the likelihood of not providing an answer, even after controlling for factors such as education. While the substantive effect is again very small (2 percentage points), the finding runs directly counter to the frequent assertion that interest groups are powerful because of their ability to inform and organize members.
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At least in the case of trade policy, this finding calls into question causal any mechanism dependent on interest groups leading to more informed voters. Given the direct link between increasing international trade and labor conditions in the U.S., labor unions, of 27 For example, Grossman and Helpman 2001. all interest groups, should have served to increase the trade policy knowledge of their members.
Additionally, higher levels of education, a proxy for high-skilled workers and thus voters with theoretically predicted free-trading preferences, are linked with a higher propensity to provide an answer. However, there is not a significant difference between the likelihood of the answers being correct or incorrect. Regionally, those in the Midwest and the South are far more likely to both offer an answer and provide a correct answer.
Consequences of regional differences are explored in the next section.
In summary, relative to other issues, trade has low salience in terms of the electorate being aware of the decisions of policy-makers ( ij k ). 28 At a reviewer's request, "Importance" was added to the "Knowledge" model depicted in Table 4 . The results showed a non-linear relationship in which both high and low rankings for the importance of trade were correlated to higher predicted probabilities of both correct and incorrect answers. With one unimportant exception, the differences were not significant.
still be considered salient -and thus interests aggregated -if politicians feared that they could be held accountable at the polls for their trade policy related decisions.
One possibility is that the electorate may use other cues such as party affiliation, knowledge of non-trade related economic policy decisions, or statements in the media to gauge a candidates' trade policy preferences 29 . Despite not "knowing" a politician's voting record directly, the electorate might vote "correctly" on the issue, allowing for their trade policy preferences to be accurately aggregated.
A second possibility is that trade is salient in electoral terms if the select few who follow trade issues are observed to significantly adjust their voting behavior according to the candidates' policy decisions and thus create a small but easily won or lost voting bloc.
However, in this case, the aggregation process would be skewed towards those who are more informed about trade policy and those who rank it as more highly. If one opinion predominates among the attentive electorate, then politicians may need to be responsive to this minority.
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A third possibility -suggested generally by Stimson et al. 31 and specifically in regards to trade by Bailey 32 -is that rational (forward-thinking) politicians select policy to match the majority preferences of their district, preventing rivals, the media, and political entrepreneurs from making an issue salient during an election. The process is "silent" in that the electorate need not rank trade as an important issue or be particularly well-informed. Bailey argues that such prospective positioning allows for the aggregation 29 Stokes and Miller 1962; Miller and Stokes 1963; Erickson 1971 . 30 This hypothesis is tested explicitly in the section entitled "Sub-sample Analysis."
31 Stimson et al. 1995. 32 Bailey 2001. of the diffuse interests of skilled (pro-trade) workers, despite collective action problems.
However, for such an aggregation mechanism to work, the electorate must still match their preferences to their voting, punishing or rewarding politicians accordingly. Match" and a vote for the incumbent; a more stringent test would require that "Issue:
Know Match" show a significant positive relationship with a vote for the incumbent. Figure 2 illustrates the predicted shift in the probability of voting for an incumbent. Given a 60% baseline probability of voting for the incumbent, matching on CAFTA has only a projected 5% shift, less than half as much as other economic policies such as increasing minimum wage (14%), extending capital gains taxes (13%), and citizenship for illegal immigrants (12% trade policy for their constituents. An un-opinionated voter offers the same benefit as conforming to the voter's preferences, whereas an opinionated voter might be turned off by the incumbent's trade policy record.
The results of the Interactive Model (column 2, Table 5 In all cases other than CAFTA, voters who know they match are far more likely to vote for the incumbent than voters who aren't aware that they do not match. In the case of CAFTA, voters who "Don't Match & Don't Know" are actually slightly more likely to vote for the incumbent than those who "Match & Know", even after controlling for party identification and agreement on a number of other issues.
In summary, voters do not appear to hold politicians accountable for their traderelated policy positions, suggesting trade issues are not salient. While the lack of accountability could be due to both lack of interest and lack of knowledge, the analysis suggests that accountability is not higher among the relatively few who are knowledgeable about their representatives' trade policy decisions. Senators who match a voter's trade policy preference can expect to see only a minimal boost in the probability of re-election; while those who don't pay a minimal cost in votes. Thus the process does not seem to be biased towards the relatively few who follow trade policy nor does the analysis support the underpinning assumption of "anticipatory reaction" that voters in upcoming election will punish or reward incumbents for their policy decisions.
Sub-sample Analysis
The national scope of the survey, aggregating across states and individuals, arguably might bias results against the salience of trade policy by numerically swamping the small, economically-defined, sub-samples of the nation for whom foreign trade policy is particularly salient. As discussed above, such individuals can be defined Unfortunately for our purposes, not one senator from a top textile producing state was up for re-election, so we redefine the sample of directly effected states as "Sugar States".
Voting results from the sugar-state Florida were deemed unusual enough to bias the finding in favor of limited saliency and were thus removed and presented separately (see Table 6 ). 39 Assuming a positive level of factor mobility, we define a set of indirectly 37 Scheve and Slaughter 2001. Bill Nelson, disagreed with his pro-CAFTA stance. However, the alternative was Republican Katherine affected states -those with a high-concentration of low-skilled workers whose wages are theoretically affected by an influx of labor-intensive goods -namely Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. A second set of sub-samples breaks the national results by region. Finally, assuming a high degree of factor mobility, we split the national sample according to skill set, with unskilled labor defined as individuals with less than a 2 year college degree. As an alternative specification, we use the respondent's self-declared position on CAFTA. Table 7 offers a summary by sub-sample of the regression output for the variable CAFTA: Match from the base accountability model (as originally presented in Table 5 ).
Salience does appear to be significantly higher in directly affected states, the Midwest, and the West. However, again, the substantive difference is negligible when the effect size is measured by the shift in probability of voting for the incumbent contingent on Singapore. However, we would predict similar or weaker saliency in large developed and developing countries such as Australia, Brazil, India, and Japan.
Even if the results are valid for the U.S. alone, these findings are meaningful more broadly. Before the demise of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization, the U.S.
was criticized by multi-lateralists for its strategy of focusing more on bi-lateral and regional trade agreements such as CAFTA rather than large-scale multi-lateral agreements. Now with no WTO-led trade negotiations for the foreseeable future, it is 43 Baker, 2005; Beaulieu, Yatawara, and Wang. 2005. likely that subsequent treaties will be closer in scale to CAFTA. If so, the American voter poses little resistance to their ratification. (Tomz et al. 2001; King et al. 2000) . All other factors kept at mean. 
